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Abstract
Federated Learning (FL) is a distributed machine
learning paradigm where data is decentralized
among clients who collaboratively train a model
in a computation process coordinated by a cen-
tral server. By assigning a weight to each client
based on the proportion of data instances it pos-
sesses, the rate of convergence to an accurate joint
model can be greatly accelerated. Some previous
works studied FL in a Byzantine setting, where
a fraction of the clients may send the server ar-
bitrary or even malicious information regarding
their model. However, these works either ignore
the issue of data unbalancedness altogether or as-
sume that client weights are known to the server a
priori, whereas, in practice, it is likely that weights
will be reported to the server by the clients them-
selves and therefore cannot be relied upon. We
address this issue for the first time by proposing a
practical weight-truncation-based preprocessing
method and demonstrating empirically that it is
able to strike a good balance between model qual-
ity and Byzantine-robustness. We also establish
analytically that our method can be applied to a
randomly-selected sample of client weights.
1. Introduction
Federated Learning (FL) (Konecˇny` et al., 2015; McMahan
et al., 2017; Kairouz et al., 2019; Bonawitz et al., 2019)
is a distributed machine learning paradigm where training
data resides at autonomous client machines and the learn-
ing process is facilitated by a central server. The server
maintains a shared model and alternates between requesting
clients to try and improve it and integrating their suggested
improvements back into that shared model.
A few interesting challenges arise from this model. First, the
need for communication efficiency, both in terms of the size
of data transferred and the number of required messages
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for reaching convergence. Second, clients are outside of
the control of the server and as such may be unreliable,
or even malicious. Third, while classical learning models
generally assume that data is homogeneous, here privacy
and the aforementioned communication concerns force us
to deal with the data as it is seen by the clients; that is 1)
non-IID (identically and independently distributed) – data
may depend on the client it resides at, and 2) unbalanced –
different clients may possess different amounts of data.
In previous works (Ghosh et al., 2019; Alistarh et al., 2018;
Li et al., 2019a; Haddadpour & Mahdavi, 2019; Pillutla
et al., 2019), unbalancedness is either ignored or is repre-
sented by a collection of a priori known client importance
weights that are usually derived from the amount of data
each client has. This work investigates aspects that stem
from this unbalancedness. Concretely, we focus on the case
where unreliable clients declare the amount of data they
have and may thus adversely influence their importance
weight. We show that without some mitigation, a single ma-
licious client can obstruct convergence in this manner even
in the presence of popular FL defense mechanisms. Our
experiments consider protections that replace the server step
by a robust mean estimator, such as median (Chen et al.,
2017; Yin et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2019a) and trimmed
mean (Yin et al., 2018).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we present required definitions and formalize the problem
addressed by this work. Section 3 presents our truncation-
based preprocessing method and proves that it can be ap-
plied to a randomly-selected sample of client weights . In
Section 4, we report on the results of our empirical evalu-
ation. Conclusions and directions for future work are pre-
sented in Section 5.
2. Problem Setup
2.1. Optimization Goal
We are given K clients where each client k has a local
collection Zk of nk samples taken IID from some unknown
distribution over sample space Z. Our objective is global
empirical risk minimization (ERM) for some loss function
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class `(w; ·) : Z → R, parameterized by w ∈ Rd 1:
min
w∈Rd
F (w), (1)
where
Z =
⋃
k∈[K]
Zk; n = |Z|; F (w) := 1
n
∑
z∈Z
`(w; z).
2.2. Collaboration Model
We restrict ourselves to the FL paradigm, which leaves the
training data distributed on client machines, and learns a
shared model by iterating between client updates and server
aggregation.
Additionally, an α-proportion of clients can be Byzantine,
meaning they can send arbitrary and possibly malicious
results on their local updates. Moreover, unlike previous
works, we also consider clients’ sample sizes to be unreli-
able because they are reported by possibly Byzantine clients.
Values that are sent by clients are marked with an overdot,
signifying that they are unreliable (e.g., n˙k).
2.3. Federated Learning Meta Algorithm
We build upon the baseline federated averaging algorithm
(FedAvg) described by McMahan et al. (2017). There, it is
suggested that in order to save communication rounds clients
perform multiple stochastic gradient descent (SGD) steps
while a central server occasionally averages the parameter
vectors.
The intuition behind this approach becomes clearer when we
mark the kth client’s ERM objective function by Fk(w) :=
1
nk
∑
z∈Zk `(w; z) and observe that the objective function
in equation (1) can be rewritten as a weighted average of
clients’ objectives:
F (w) :=
1
n
∑
k∈[K]
nkFk(w).
Similarly to previous works (Pillutla et al., 2019; Chen et al.,
2019b;a), we capture a large set of algorithms by abstracting
FedAvg into a meta-algorithm for FL (Algorithm 2). We
require three procedures to be specified by any concrete
algorithm:
(a) Preprocess – receives, possibly byzantine, n˙k’s from
clients and produces secure estimates marked as n˜k’s.
1We note that some previous FL works specify a more generic
finite-sum objective (McMahan et al., 2017). However, this work
investigates client-declared sample sizes, whose meaning is clear
under the ERM interpretation but seems meaningless in the finite-
sum objective setting.
To the best of our knowledge, previous works ignore
this procedure and assume nk’s are correct.
(b) ClientUpdate – per-client wk computation. In
FedAvg, this corresponds to a few local mini-batch
SGD rounds. See Algorithm 1 for pseudocode.
(c) Aggregate – the server’s strategy for updating w. In
FedAvg, this corresponds to the weighted arithmetic
mean, i.e., w ← 1n˙
∑
k∈[K] n˙kw˙k.
Algorithm 1 FedAvg: ClientUpdate
Hyperparameters: learning rate (η), number of epochs
(E), and batch size (B).
for E epochs do
for B-sized batch B ⊆ Zk do
wk ← wk − η 1B
∑
z∈B∇`(wk; z)
end for
end for
Algorithm 2 Federated Learning Meta-Algorithm
Given procedures: Preprocess, ClientUpdate, and
Aggregate.
{n˙k}k∈[K] ← collect sample size from each client
{n˜k}k∈[K] ← Preprocess({n˙k}k∈[K])
w ← initial guess
for t← 1 to T do
St ← a random set of client indices
for all k ∈ St do
w˙k ← ClientUpdate(n˜k, w)
end for
w ← Aggregate({〈n˜k, w˙k〉}k∈St)
end for
3. Preprocessing Client-Declared Sample
Sizes
3.1. Preliminaries
We use N to denote the vector containing each client’s
declared sample size,N = (n˙1, n˙2, . . . , n˙K). For a given
upper bound on the proportion of Byzantine clients, denoted
by α, we define top(N , α) as the collection of the αK
largest values inN . We assume, w.l.o.g., thatN is sorted
in increasing order and that αK ∈ N. Additionally, we
define mwp(N , α) – the maximal weight proportion an α-
proportion of clients can have when considering N as a
weight vector2:
mwp(N , α) :=
∑
top(N , α)∑
N
.
2∑X denotes the sum of all values inX .
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Previous works (Ghosh et al., 2019; Alistarh et al., 2018;
Li et al., 2019a; Haddadpour & Mahdavi, 2019; Zhao et al.,
2018) either assumed that all clients have the same sam-
ple size or that there exists some constant α∗ ≤ 1/2 such
that mwp(N , α) < α∗. Both assumptions are unrealistic,
because in practice algorithms trust the value each client
reports and use it in their Aggregate procedure, implying
that even a single malicious client can force mwp(N , α) to
be arbitrarily close to 1. For this reason, we require that any
Preprocess procedure ensures the following:
mwp(Preprocess(N), α) ≤ α∗. (2)
3.2. Truncating the Values ofN
Our suggested preprocessing procedure uses element-wise
truncation of the values of N by some value U , marked
trunc(N , U) := {min(n,U) : n ∈ N}. When given α,
the maximal proportion of Byzantine clients, and a desired
maximal weight proportion α∗, we search for the appropri-
ate maximal truncation, U :
argmax
U∈N
s.t. mwp(trunc(N , U), α) ≤ α∗. (3)
Generally, the desiredα∗ is an analytical property of any spe-
cific ClientUpdate and Aggregate combination while α
and U present a trade-off. Higher α means more Byzantine
tolerance but requires smaller truncation value U , which,
as we demonstrate empirically, may cause slower and less
accurate convergence.
We note that given α and α∗, truncatingN by solving (3) is
optimal in the sense that any other Preprocess procedure
that adheres to (2) has an equal or larger L1 distance from
the original N . This follows easily from the observation
that, when truncating the values ofN , the entire distance
is due to the truncated elements and if there was another
applicable vector closer toN , we could have increased U
in contradiction to its maximally.
3.2.1. FINDING A MAXIMAL U GIVEN α
If one has an estimate for α it is easy to calculate U . For
example, by going over values inN in a decreasing order
(i.e., from index K downwards) until finding a value that
satisfies the inequality in (3). Then we mark the index of
this value by u and use the fact that in the range [nu, nu+1]
we can express mwp(trunc(N , U), α) as a simple function
of the form a+bUc+dU :
∑
i≤u∧ni∈top(N ,α) ni + |{ni : i > u ∧ ni ∈ top(N , α)}|U∑
i≤u ni + |{ni : i > u}|U
,
Algorithm 3 Report (α, U ) Pairs
α← α∗
for u← 1 toK − 1 do
whilemwp(trunc(N , nu+1), α) > α∗ do
U ← solve (4) for U ∈ [nu, nu+1]
report (α, U )
α← α− 1K
end while
end for
for which we can solve (3) with
U ←
⌊
a− cα∗
dα∗ − b
⌋
. (4)
3.2.2. THE α-U TRADE-OFF
When we do not know α, as a practical procedure, we sug-
gest plotting U as a function of α. In order to do so we
can start with α← α∗, U ← n1, and alternate between de-
creasing α by 1/K (one less Byzantine client tolerated) and
solving (3). This procedure can be made efficient by saving
intermediate sums and using a specialized data structure for
trimmed collections. See Algorithm 3 for pseudocode and
Figure 1 for an example output.
3.3. Truncation Given a Partial View ofN
When K is very large we may want to sample only k  K
elements IID fromN . In this case we will need to test that
the inequality in (3) holds with high probability.
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
U
* = 50%
Figure 1. Example plot of data generated by executing Algorithm
3 on unbalanced vector N and α∗ = 50% (this vector corre-
sponds to the partition used in our experiments; See Section 4.1
for details).
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We consider k discrete random variables taken IID from
N after truncation by U , that is, taken from a dis-
tribution over {0, 1, . . . , U}. We mark these random
variables as X1, X2, . . . , Xk, and their order statistic as
X(1), X(2), . . . , X(k) where X(1) ≤ X(2) ≤ · · · ≤ X(k).
Theorem 3.1. Given parameter δ > 0 and ε1 =
√
ln (3/δ)
2k ,
ε2 = U
√
ln ln (3/δ)
2(k(α−ε1)+1) , ε3 = U
√
ln ln (3/δ)
2k , we have that
mwp(trunc(N , U), α) ≤ α∗ is true with 1− δ confidence
if the following holds:
α
(∑k
i←d(1−(α−ε1))keX(i)
k−d(1−(α−ε1))ke+1 + ε2
)(
1
k
∑
i∈[k]Xi − ε3
) ≤ α∗ .
Proof. First we observe that mwp(trunc(N , U), α) ≤ α∗
can be rewritten as
mwp(trunc(N , U), α) =
∑
top(trunc(N , U), α)∑
trunc(N , U)
=
αE[top(trunc(N , U), α)]
E[trunc(N , U)]
≤ α∗ . (5)
Then we note that membership in top(trunc(N , U), α) can
be viewed as a simple Bernoulli random variable with prob-
ability α, for which we obtain the following bound using
Hoeffding’s inequality, t ≥ 0:
Pr
[|{i ∈ [k] : Xi ∈ top(trunc(N , U), α)}| ≤ (α− t)k]
≤ e−2t2k .
Therefore with t = ε1, we have the following with 1 − δ3
confidence:
∑
top({Xi | i ∈ [k]}, α)
≤
∑
{X(i) | d(1− (α− ε1))ke ≤ i ≤ k} . (6)
Using Hoeffding’s inequality again, we can bound the ex-
pectation of X(i) | d(1 − (α − ε1))ke ≤ i ≤ k by ε2 with
1− δ3 confidence and together with (6) have that:
E[top(trunc(N , U), α)]
≤
∑k
i←d(1−(α−ε1))keX(i)
k − d(1− (α− ε1))ke+ 1 + ε2 . (7)
Then, using Hoeffding’s inequality for the third time,
E[trunc(N , U)] is bound from below by ε3 with 1 − δ3
confidence:
E[trunc(N , U)] ≥ 1
k
∑
i∈[k]
Xi − ε3 . (8)
The proof is concluded by applying (6-8) to (5) using the
union bound.
3.4. Convergence Notes
After applying our Preprocess procedure we have the trun-
cated number of samples per client, marked {n˜k}k∈[K].
We can trivially ensure that any algorithm instance works
as expected by requiring that clients ignore samples that
were truncated. That is, even if an honest client k (non-
Byzantine) has nk samples it may use only n˜k samples
during its ClienUpdate.
Although this solution always preserves the semantics of
any underlying algorithm, it does hurt convergence guaran-
tees since the total number of samples decreases (Kairouz
et al. 2019, Tables 5 and 6; Yin et al. 2018; Haddadpour &
Mahdavi 2019). Interestingly, Li et al. (2019b, Theorem 3)
analyze the baseline FedAvg and show that its convergence
bound decreases with maxnk (marked there as ν). This
suggests that in some cases truncation itself may mitigate
the decrease in total sample size.
Lastly, we note that in practice, the performance of federated
averaging based algorithms improves when honest clients
use all their original nk samples. Intuitively, this follows
easily from the observation that Aggregate procedures are
generally composite mean estimators and ClientUpdate
calls are likely to produce more accurate results given more
samples.
4. Evaluation
In this section we demonstrate how truncatingN is a crucial
requirement for Byzantine robustness. That is, we show that
no matter what is the specific attack or aggregation method,
usingN “as-is” categorically devoids any robustness guar-
anties.
4.1. Experimental Setup
A supervised learning task We train classifiers for the
MNIST database (LeCun et al., 2010). It includes 28×28
grayscale labeled images of handwritten digits split into a
60,000 training set and a 10,000 test set.
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Figure 2. Accuracy by round without any attackers. Curves correspond to preprocessing procedures and columns correspond to different
aggregation methods. It can be seen that our method (dashed orange curve) remains comparable to the properly weighted mean estimators
(solid blue curve) while ignoring clients’ sample sizes (dotted green curve) is sub-optimal. This effect is pronounced when the unweighted
median is used, since with our unbalanced partition it is generally very far from the mean.
Data distribution We randomly partition the training set
among 100 clients. The partition sizes are determined by
taking 100 samples from a Lognormal distribution with µ=
1.5, σ=3.45, and then interpolating corresponding integers
that sum to 60,000. This produces a right-skewed, fat-tailed
partition size distribution that emphasizes the importance
of correctly weighting aggregation rules and the effects of
truncation. See Figure 3 for a histogram of the partition.
Client update Clients train using a 64-units perceptron
with RelU activation and 20% dropout, followed by a soft-
max layer. Following Yin et al. (2018), on every communi-
cation round, all clients perform mini-batch SGD with 10%
of their examples.
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Figure 3. Histogram of the sample partition used in the experi-
ments.
Server aggregation We show three Aggregate proce-
dures. Arithmetic mean, as used by the original FedAvg,
and two additional procedures that replace the arithmetic
mean with robust mean estimators. The first of the latter
uses the coordinatewise median (Chen et al., 2017; Yin
et al., 2018). That is, each server model coordinate is taken
as the median of the clients’ corresponding coordinates.
The second robust aggregation method uses the coordinate-
wise trimmed mean (Yin et al., 2018) that, for a given hy-
perparameter β, first removes β-proportion lowest and β-
proportion highest values in each coordinate and only then
calculates the arithmetic mean of the remaining values.
Preprocessing client-declared sample size We either ig-
nore client sample size, truncate according to α = 10%
and α∗ = 50%, or just passthrough client sample size as
reported.
Attack In order to provide comparability, we follow the
experiment shown by Yin et al. (2018) in which 10% of the
clients use a label shifting attack. In this attack, Byzantine
clients train normally except for the fact that they replace
every training label y with 9−y. The values sent by these
clients are then incorrect but are relatively moderate in value
making their attack somewhat harder to detect. Additionally,
we examine a model negation attack (Blanchard et al., 2017).
In this attack, each attacker “pushes” the model towards
zero by always returning a negation of the server’s model.
When the data distribution is balanced, this attack is easily
neutralized since Byzantine clients typically send extreme
values. However, in our unbalanced case, we demonstrate
that without our preprocessing step, this attack cannot be
Towards Realistic Byzantine-Robust Federated Learning
La
be
l s
hi
ft,
 1
 a
tta
ck
er
Mean Median Trimmed mean = 10%
La
be
l s
hi
ft,
 1
0%
 a
tta
ck
er
s
M
od
el
 n
eg
at
io
n,
 1
 a
tta
ck
er
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Rounds
M
od
el
 n
eg
at
io
n,
 1
0%
 a
tta
ck
er
s
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Rounds
Passthrough Truncate =10%, * =50% Ignore
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Rounds
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Ac
cu
ra
cy
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Ac
cu
ra
cy
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Ac
cu
ra
cy
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Ac
cu
ra
cy
Figure 4. Accuracy by round under Byzantine attacks. Curves correspond to preprocessing procedures and columns correspond to different
aggregation methods. In the first two rows Byzantine clients perform a label shifting attack with one and 10% attackers, respectively. In
the last two rows we repeat the experiment with a model negation attack.
We observe that even with a single attacker performing a trivial attack (first and third rows), using the weights directly (solid blue curve) is
devastating while when our preprocessing method is used in conjunction with robust mean aggregations (dashed orange curve, two last
columns) convergence remain stable even when there are actual α (=10%) attackers (second and forth rows). We note that in some cases
our method may be slightly less efficient compared with the preprocessing method that ignores sample size altogether (dotted green curve,
second row, last column). This is to be expected because we allow Byzantine clients to potentially get close to α∗-proportion (50%, in
this case) of the weight. However, our method is significantly closer to the optimal solution when there are no or only a few attackers (see
Figure 2). Moreover, when used in conjunction with robust mean aggregation methods it maintains their robustness properties.
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Table 1. Final test accuracies (%).
PREPROCESSING ATTACK
AGGREGATION
MEAN MEDIAN TRIMMED MEAN
IGNORE
NONE 78.37 54.76 79.77
LABEL SHIFT
1 77.87 53.9 78.54
10% 75.33 49.6 77.66
MODEL NEGATION
1 64.8 54.9 78.56
10% 9.58 57.12 76.94
PASSTROUGH
NONE 83.98 83.73 83.83
LABEL SHIFT
1 9.77 9.81 9.81
10% 4.66 8.85 4.26
MODEL NEGATION
1 11.35 11.35 9.8
10% 11.35 9.8 9.8
TRUNCATE
NONE 83.56 83.56 83.49
LABEL SHIFT
1 82.85 83.15 83.14
10% 66.31 77.95 77.0
MODEL NEGATION
1 11.35 83.53 83.3
10% 11.35 81.99 83.55
mitigated even by robust aggregation methods.
We first execute our experiment without any attacks for
every server aggregation and preprocessing combination.
Then, for each attack type, we repeat the process two ad-
ditional times: 1) with a single attacker that declares 10
million samples, and 2) with 10% attackers that declare 1
million samples each.
4.2. Results
The experiment without any attackers is shown in Figure 2,
the executions with attackers are shown in Figure 4 and the
final test accuracies from all experiments are summarized
in Table 1.
The results from the first experiment, running without any
attackers (Figure 2), demonstrate that ignoring client sample
size results in reduced accuracy, especially when median
aggregation is used, whereas truncating according to our
procedure is significantly better and is in par with properly
using all weights. These results highlight the imperative-
ness of using sample size weights when performing server
aggregations.
While Figure 2 shows that the truncation-based preprocess-
ing performs in par with that of taking all weights into con-
sideration when all clients are honest, Figure 4 demonstrates
that the results are very different when there is an attack. In
this case, we see that when even a single attacker reports a
highly exaggerated sample size and the server relies on all
the values ofN , the performance of all aggregation meth-
ods including robust median and trimmed mean quickly
degrade to less than a random classifier. This is the case
for both the label shifting and the model negation attacks.
The label shifting attack has been shown to be mitigated by
robust aggregation in the balanced setting and the model
negation attack is even simpler to mitigate in the balanced
setting because, as previously mentioned, Byzantine clients
that employ it often send extreme values.
In contrast, in our experiments robustness is maintained
when truncation-based preprocessing is used in conjunction
with robust mean aggregations, even when Byzantine clients
attain the maximal supported proportion (α=10%).
5. Conclusion and Future Work
Our method is based on truncating the weight values re-
ported by clients in a manner that bounds from above the
proportion α∗ of weights that can be attributed to Byzantine
clients, given an upper bound on the proportion of clients α
that may be Byzantine. Different values of parameter α rep-
resent different points in the trade-off between model quality
and Byzantine-robustness, where higher values increase ro-
bustness when attacks do occur but decrease convergence
rate even in the lack of attacks.
We evaluated the performance of our truncation method
empirically when applied as a preprocessing stage, prior to
several aggregation methods, against two types of Byzantine
attacks: label shifting attack and model negation attack. The
results of our experiments establish that: 1) in the absence
of attacks, model convergence is in par with that of properly
using all reported weights, and 2) when attacks do occur, the
performance of combining truncation-based preprocessing
and robust aggregations incurs almost no penalty in com-
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parison with the performance of using of all weights in the
lack of attacks, whereas without preprocessing, even robust
aggregation methods collapse to performance worse than
that of a random classifier.
When the number of clients is very large, performing server
preprocessing and aggregation on the server may become
computationally infeasible. We prove that, in this case,
truncation-based preprocessing achieves the same upper
bound on α∗ w.h.p. based on the weight values reported
from a sufficiently large number of the clients selected IID.
In future work, we plan to further analyze the trade-off
between robustness and the usage of client sample size in
rectifying data unbalancedness. We also plan to investigate
alternative forms of estimating client importance that may
avoid the usage of client sample size altogether.
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